



Cambridge Model United Nations Conference

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Security Council

**Agenda 2: Ramifications of North Korea's
Aggressive Missile Program**

Letter from the Executive Board

Greetings delegates

Welcome to the simulation of the Security Council at the CAMUN 2013. This session shall be presided over by Ms. Vasavi Nirjar and assisting her will be Mr. Mayank Gupta as the Vice President and Ms. Neeharika Garg as the Rapporteur.

The Security Council provides the right platform where your negotiation skills come to the foray and more so glaring your lobbying skill. Keeping in mind the sheer delegates, we believe every statement you make shall value greatly because in such an important committee of the UN, the quality of the content is really important and so do the way you present it, in order to get the attention of your fellow delegates. What you say as a delegate has the power to determine security situation in one or more countries or maybe even the entire world. The Security Council is a platform where various different aspects to an issue can be discussed, so feel free to take the debate to different avenues but keep in mind the mandate of the Security Council.

It is the delegates that make the MUN what it is, so the level of the debate and competition highly depends on you, we are merely there to facilitate debate and moderate the committee proceedings. The responsibility of the experience you have at this MUN depends on you, so make sure that it is a committee where you feel satisfied about your performance.

From each one of you, we expect impeccable diplomatic conduct – which includes diplomatic courtesy, effective lobbying and above all compromising on negotiable grounds. Delegates are also expected to be well versed with the MUN rules of procedure and the generic flow of committee proceedings, in order to enhance the level of debate.

We hope you to have a memorable experience but at the same time learn and grow as a MUNer and as a person at the end of this MUN.

Feel free to revert back to the executive board for any queries or for any form of assistance you shall need.

Wish you best of luck for the conference.

Mayank Gupta

Vice President

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COMMITTEE DESCRIPTION

History:

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 in London, England. Since its first meeting, the Council, which exists in continuous session, has traveled widely, holding meetings in many cities, such as Paris and Addis Ababa, as well as at its current permanent home at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

The five permanent members of the Security Council consisted of France, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, at the UN's founding in 1946. With the exception of China and Russia, the current P5 members are represented by the main victorious powers of World War II.

Purpose and mission statement:

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at United Nations Headquarters. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement.

The UN's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which gives the Security Council the power to:

- Investigate any situation threatening international peace;
- Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute;
- Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations;
- Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary;
- Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation.

Ramifications of North Korea's Aggressive Missile Program

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- North Korea currently possesses between four and eight nuclear weapons. It has carried out three nuclear tests since 2006.
- It has developed and tested a range of short- and medium-range missiles, but has yet to successfully test a long-range missile or ICBM.
- It is generally believed to have not yet developed the capabilities needed to miniaturize a nuclear device for missile delivery.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

Claimed Objective: Deter a U.S. invasion and hostile policy against it, such as U.S. sanctions and joint military exercises with South Korea. Pyongyang believes the United States desires regime change.

Apparent Objective: Regime survival and recognition as a nuclear power. The regime believes that its nuclear and ballistic missile programs enhance its security and diplomatic position (1) domestically, as a demonstration of strength against hostile Americans, and (2) internationally, as a bargaining chip and means to be treated as equal to nuclear weapons states. The regime has recently revised its constitution, which now refers to North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, a status that, in the international arena, is only granted to the five states that possessed nuclear weapons in 1968, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signatures (the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China). Pyongyang also appears to be pursuing the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a long-range ballistic missile.

Number of nuclear weapons: Unverified, but total plutonium production suggests between four to eight nuclear weapons.

North Korea's uranium enrichment work could complicate any future international talks on dismantling its nuclear program, especially if ally China backs Pyongyang in saying that it is for peaceful purposes only.

General Sources:

- Diplomatic sources
- Mary Beth Nitkin, "[North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues](#)," Congressional Research Service,

Nuclear Programs

Plutonium

- **Facilities:** Yongbyon nuclear complex; North Hamgyong Province (Chungjinsi, Kiljugun, Pungyre); Chagangdo Province (Kanggyesi); North Pyongan Province (Yongbyonsi, Kusungsi, Taechongun); South Pyongan Province (Pyongsungsi)

- **Stockpile:** Believed to be between 30 kg and 50 kg, with a portion of the stockpile having actually been used in North Korea's nuclear tests.

Uranium Enrichment

- **Facilities**

Suspected – Pyongyang; Pakchon; Taechon; Chonmasan; Hagap; Yongjori;
Confirmed – Yongbyon (pilot plant). In November 2010, Pyongyang unveiled a pilot uranium enrichment plant to American scientist Siegfried Hecker. It is widely believed to be a cover for its clandestine uranium enrichment programs, and not intended for peaceful nuclear energy generation. Other sites are believed to be hidden.

- **Stockpile:** Unknown. It is virtually impossible to verify enriched uranium stockpiles from a technical standpoint.

General Sources:

- Various open and diplomatic sources.
- "North Korea's Nuclear Material Production Site is Chunmasan Basement: A Former North Korean People's Liberation Army Defector's Testimony," Shin Donga, 1 Aug 2001 (Korean language).

Nuclear Testing

Apparent Objective: To miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount on a long-range missile.

Nuclear tests: Three.

1. October 2006 – Claimed successful.

On October 16, the [U.S. Director of National Intelligence](#) confirmed "North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton," and later said it was apparently more successful. One kiloton is far less than other nuclear states' first tests of 10-20 kt. The international community has called the North's test a failure.

2. May 25, 2009 – Claimed successful. Deemed unsuccessful.

On June 15, the [U.S. Director of National Intelligence](#) stated, "The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of the event continues." However, there is a lack of conclusive physical evidence in open sources that proves the test was a nuclear one. Official and unofficial reports vary on estimated yield but it is generally regarded as higher than its 2006 test.

Test site: Pungyre (Northeast, 2006 & 2009 test site); Yongdoktong (Northwest; speculated)

Nuclear site: Kumchangri (underground site speculated to house a nuclear facility)

3. February 12, 2013 - Claimed successful. Widely deemed successful.

On February 12, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence [stated](#), "The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on February 12, 2013. The explosion yield was approximately several kilotons.

It is unclear how soon Pyongyang will be able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount on a missile.

General Sources: Joseph Medalia, [“North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications,”](#) Congressional Research Service.

BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES

Apparent Objective: Improve conventional war capabilities. Develop missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads targeted at regional adversaries and the continental US. A grave concern remains the possible development of an inter-continental ballistic missile capable of delivering a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead that can reach the U.S. continent. Given repeated test failures, most missile experts believe Pyongyang is far from achieving this goal.

Ballistic Missile Facility: Musudan-ri; Yongjo-ri; Sangnam-ri; Tongchang-ri, Chiha-ri

Delivery Systems (Ballistic Missiles)

Short-Range

- **KN-01** – short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Range estimated at 160 km. Believed to be an improved version of the Soviet Termit missile (“Styx”).
- **KN-02** – short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile. Range [estimated](#) between 100-120 km. Modified copy of the Soviet OTR-21 (SS-21 Tochka; also referred to as “Scarab”); unknown number in service; believed to have been deployed in the late 1990s or early 2000s.
- **Hwasong-5 (Scud-B)** – short-range, initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile. Estimated range of 300 km (can reach throughout South Korea) and capable of delivering a 900 kg payload. Tested successfully. First deployed in [1988](#). Delivered to Iran for Iraq-Iran war.
- **Hwasong-6 (Scud-C, Scud-PIP)** - Improved version of Hwasong-5. Range of 500 km, able to carry 700-800 kg payload. First deployed in [1988](#). Said to be the most widely deployed missile, with at least 400 in service.

Medium-Range

- **Rodong (Nodong-1)**– medium-range missile with an estimated range of 1,000-1,500 km; payload of 1,000 kg. Capable of reaching across Japan; capable of carrying a simple nuclear warhead, according to analysis from ISIS. First deployed in 1998. DPRK has deployed between 175 and 200 of these missiles.

Intermediate-Range

- **Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1)** – two-stage liquid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile, modified to serve as a three-stage space launch vehicle; incapable of delivering nuclear payload to intercontinental ranges due to poor technical accuracy; estimated range of 2,000-2,900 km.
- **Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2/Unha-2/Unha-3)** – larger, more capable multi-stage missile; currently under development. Depending on size of payload, [possible strategic capability](#) against continental U.S; believed to be a potential intercontinental ballistic missile; exact range unknown, various government estimates of possible ranges run from [3,400-15,000 km](#).
- **Musudan-1 (Taepodong-X, Nodong-B, BM-25)** – single-stage intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM); range [2,500-4,000 km](#) capable of direct strikes on South Korea, Japan,

and Guam, thus putting U.S. military bases [at risk](#); Has not been tested and is not known to be operational.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

- **KN08** -- North Korean road mobile ICBM; first presented at parade in April 2012, but many analysts argue that the missiles on display were only mock-ups. Has not been tested, and no open-source evidence exists to suggest that they are operational.


Long-Range Rockets (Space Launch Vehicles)

- **Unha rocket-Kwangmyongsong satellite combo** -- The North claims its long-range rockets are designed for peaceful scientific purposes to launch a satellite into orbit. However, the UN Security Council and international community view long-range rockets as synonymous with long-range missiles – the technology used in space launchers is essentially the same as ballistic missile technology. Global diplomats and scientists view Pyongyang’s claimed objective as veiled practice rounds to eventually launch a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead.

General Sources

- Various open sources: South Korean Defense Ministry, International Institute for Strategic Studies, International Crisis Group.
- "[Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](#)," Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- "[Resources on North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program](#)," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.
- Steven Pifer, "[North Korea and Nuclear-Armed Missiles: Calming the Hyperbole](#)," Brookings Institution.
- Sungwoo Park, "[North Korea Nuclear Detonations, Missile Tests: Timeline](#)," Bloomberg.

North Korean missile ranges
Maximum estimated/calculated



Source: Council for Foreign Relations

Exports related to Ballistic Missile Technology

Export partners

Many countries have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production.

Pakistan

North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1999 in return for nuclear weapons technology. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong missile.

Egypt

Egypt has received technologies and assistance for making both the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, and may have as well provided guidance systems or information on longer-range missiles to North Korea from its Condor program.

Iran

One of the first buyers of North Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Also possesses some 18 land-based BM25 missiles. North Korean weapons sales to Iran are estimated to total \$2 billion annually.

Libya

Libya during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi had been known to receive technological assistance, blueprints and missile parts from North Korea.

Syria

Syria originally obtained the SCUD-B from North Korea. North Korea may have assisted Syria in development of the SCUD-C and/or the SCUD-D. As of 2013, Syria relies on foreign assistance from multiple countries, including North Korea, for advanced missile components and technologies.


United Arab Emirates

25 Hwasong-5s purchased from North Korea in 1989. The Military of the United Arab Emirates were not satisfied with the quality of the missiles, and they were kept in storage.

Rejection by a potential export partner

Nigeria

The Nigerian government announced that North Korea agreed to sell its missile technology, but a month later Nigeria rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.



North Korea and Nuclear Weapons - Policy Options

Option 1: Launch a Preemptive Military Strike

Goals of Option 1

- Eliminate North Korea's nuclear capability by destroying the reactors and processors that are producing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium.
- Communicate to other states that nuclear proliferation is unacceptable

U.S. Policies to Achieve These Goals

- Use the U.S. military to destroy North Korea's nuclear weapons production facilities.
- Prepare to respond to any North Korean attacks.

Underlying Beliefs of Option 1

- Military might is the only language Kim Jong Il understands. We should not negotiate with irrational, untrustworthy people.
- The molasses-like speed with which the international community can deal with problems such as these will not meet the requirements of the timetable in this case.
- The containment policy in use since 1994 has failed.

Arguments Against Option 1

- A pre-emptive unilateral attack on North Korea would violate international law.
- To bypass negotiation in favor of plans for military action will only increase North Korea's determination to build a nuclear capability as quickly as possible as a deterrence.
- It is very possible that the North Korean nuclear weapons development facilities are not all above ground. We are sure to miss some of them in a conventional airstrike.
- In response to a military strike North Korea could launch strikes of its own against Japan, China, or South Korea, or our bases in those countries. Such a war could mean the deaths of millions.

- A war could also mean economic disaster resulting from the possible destruction of the Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul stock markets.

Option 2: Pressure North Korea to Return to the Six-party Negotiations

Goals of Option 2

- * Contain the threat from North Korea and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction.
- * Contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- * Protect U.S. interests in the region.

U.S. Policies to Achieve These Goals

- * Engage with North Korea only as part of multi-party talks. Do not reward North Korea's threatening behavior with direct negotiation or with aid.
- * Impress upon regional powers the severity of the crisis and work with them to push for sanctions in the UN that will bring North Korea back to the negotiation table.
- Make it very clear that we will counter with comparable force—alone or with others—any aggressive actions on the part of North Korea.
- Provide strong U.S. support for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

Underlying Beliefs of Option 2

- We cannot afford to let North Korea make the rules. Tyrants like Kim Jong-Il only understand force and power. Negotiations and deals that reward bad behavior will only produce more problems for the United States in the long run.
- The people of North Korea are starving; providing aid in return for false promises from the North Koreans only prolongs the existence of a regime that will create another crisis in the future when it needs more assistance.

Arguments Against Option 2


- North Korea has now demonstrated that they have a nuclear capability. Unless we destroy their weapons facilities, they will continue to build nuclear weapons. Nothing short of a military attack can guarantee U.S. security.
- We have tried to pressure and coax the North Koreans to participate in six-party talks. Unless we agree to talk with them directly, they will not participate in negotiations.

Option 3: Engage North Korea in Bilateral Negotiations that

Involve Concessions on Both Sides

Option 4: Withdraw from the Korean Peninsula

Key North Korean missiles



SOURCE: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Federation of American Scientists
Global Security, US Congressional report, International Institute for Strategic Studies

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER:

1. What are the general sources and evidences that support the presence of missile program in North Korea?
2. What threat/ danger does the Aggressive Missile Program of North Korea impose on the world?
3. What are the Ballistic Missile Capabilities of North Korea? Also highlight the exports related to Ballistic Missile Technology.
4. How are North Korea's foreign relations with USA and China and how they have changed over the years?
5. Discuss upon the various policy options that could be adopted to deal with the situation in North Korea.

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